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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant Richard L. Holbert appeals from a judgment on 
a jury verdict finding him guilty of Aggravated Kidnaping, a 
first degree felony, in violation of U.C.A.. § 76-5-302 
(1953 As Amended). The defendant was sentenced on January 
11, 2001 to serve an indeterminate term of not less than 10 
years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison. 
Notice of Appeal was filed with the trial court on February 
12, 2001. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 
78-2a-3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue One: Did the trial court err in permitting prior 
bad act testimony? 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial courtfs 
decision to admit evidence under of prior convictions, 
wrongs and acts, the appellate court applies an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 1 18, 
P.3d . In the proper exercise of that discretion, 
trial judges must "scrupulously" examine the evidence before 
it is admitted. Id. 
Issue Two: Did the trial court err in admitting evidence 
obtained from the defendant's apartment without a search 
warrant? 
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Standard of Review: The trial court's factual findings 
are reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Finlayson, 
2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243 (citations omitted). However, the 
legal effect of those facts is within the province of the 
appellate court, and "no deference need be given a [lower] 
court's resolution of such questions of law."SLW/Utah, 
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998). 
Issue Three: Was the defendant deprived of his right to 
effective assistance of counsel? 
Standard of Review: A claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel raised for the first time on appeal without a 
prior evidentiary hearing presents a question of law. 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(citations omitted). Questions of law are reviewed non-
deferentially for correctness. State v\ Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
935-36 (Utah 1994). 
Issue Four: Did the evidence support a conviction for 
aggravated kidnaping? 
Standard of Review. On appeal, the court reviews the 
evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the 
verdict. State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App 123, P.3d , 
citing State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 1 42, 994 P.2d 177. 
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Whether two or more crimes merge, thereby precluding 
separate convictions, is then "essentially an issue of 
statutory construction that we review for correctness, 
according no particular deference to the trial court." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Issue Five: Was confidence in a fair trial undermined 
by the cumulative effect of errors committed during trial? 
Standard of Review: Under the cumulative error 
doctrine, the appellate court will reverse a conviction only 
if "the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines 
our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." State v. 
Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, P.3d , citing, State v. 
Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 1 25, 999 P.2d 7 (citations omitted) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
United States Const. Amen. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Utah Statutes 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. 
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(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnaping if the actor, in 
the course of committing unlawful detention or kidnaping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon 
as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield 
or hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in 
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular 
conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or 
flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a 
felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim 
or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental 
or political function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing 
unlawful detention or kidnaping" means in the course of 
committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnaping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a first degree felony punish-
able by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life. Im-
prisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406. 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
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assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; 
or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second degree 
felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1)(b) is a third degree 
felony. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant 
evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these 
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
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(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, 
or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a 
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In 
other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible 
if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject 
to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) 
evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the 
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked 
by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the 
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction 
of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of 
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the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
concerning the witness1 character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to 
which character the witness being cross-examined has 
testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any 
other witness, does not; operate as a waiver of the accused's 
or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when 
examined with respect to matters which relate only to 
credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to 
misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by 
examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced. 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, 
if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted 
of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines 
that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is 
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has 
elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release 
of the witness from the confinement imposed for that 
conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court 
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative 
value of the conviction supported by specific facts and 
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial 
effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten 
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years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the 
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of 
such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of 
rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible 
under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject 
of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or 
other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the 
rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has 
not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, 
or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, 
annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile 
adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. 
The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of 
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused 
if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack 
the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that 
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination 
of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom 
does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. 
Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Richard L. Holbert appeals from a judgment on 
a jury verdict finding him guilty of Aggravated Kidnaping, a 
first degree felony, in violation of U.C.A.. § 76-5-302 
(1953 As Amended). The defendant was originally charged with 
violation of U.C.A. 76-5-103, Aggravated Assault, a third 
degree felony. That charge was dismissed when federal 
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charges were brought against him. After the defendant was 
sentenced on the federal charge, the State re-filed against 
the defendant, charging him with Aggravated Kidnaping, in 
violation of U.C.A. §76-5-302, a first degree felony, and, 
once again, Aggravated Assault. Just before trial, the 
State dismissed the charge for Aggravated Assault. 
At a pretrial conference on October 10, 2000, the court 
was advised that resolution of a charge against the 
defendant for violation of a protective order would trail 
the State's prosecution against the defendant on the 
kidnaping charge. The parties agreed that in the event the 
defendant was convicted by the jury on the aggravated 
kidnaping charge, the defendant would enter a plea of 
"guilty" to the protective order violation and the State 
would support any sentence imposed for the violation to run 
concurrent with the sentence imposed on a subsequent 
conviction. 
After a three-day trial, the jury returned of verdict o 
Guilty of the charge of Aggravated Kidnaping. R. 120. The 
defendant moved to arrest judgment. R. 136. The trial court 
denied defendant's motion and sentenced him on January 11, 
2001 to serve an indeterminate term of not less than 10 
years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison on 
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the aggravated kidnaping conviction, and a concurrent term 
of zero to five years on the felony protective order 
violation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant and Mrs. Holbert were the only people 
inside the home on August 12, 1999 at the time of the 
interaction between the parties giving rise to the charges 
against the defendant. 
The evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict is as follows: The defendant arrived at Mrs. 
Holbertsf home to get his bowling ball. R. 220 p. 115. As 
Mrs. Holbert was going into the home to get the bowling ball 
for him, the defendant "shoved" her into the home and shut 
the door behind them. R. 220 p. 118. Mrs. Holbert 
testified that Mr. Holbert then pulled a gun from his 
waistband with one hand and pointed it at her head as he 
began to lock the door with his other hand. R. 220 p. 119. 
At the same time, Mrs. Holbert tried to get out the door. R. 
220 p. 121. Mrs. Holbert then ran to the back door of the 
home and was able to unlock the chain, dead bolt and 
doorknob lock, and open the door at least two inches before 
the defendant slammed the door shut. R. 220 p. 123. Mrs. 
Holbert either was pushed by the defendant into the 
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bedroom, or she cannot recall how she ended up in the 
bedroom. R. 220 p. 122-124. Defendant then shut the 
bedroom door and again held the gun toward Mrs. Holberts 
head. R. 220 p. 125. Mrs. Holbert testified that the 
defendant told her at that point, "you want a divorce? You 
are going to die. I'm going to kill you." R. 220 p. 125. 
In fear for her life, Mrs. Holbert told the defendant that 
she did not want a divorce that she wanted to make the 
marriage work. R. 220 p. 126. Mr. Holbert was distracted 
by the ringing doorbell and he left the house. R. 220 p. 
127. The entire incident lasted approximately four minutes. 
R. 220 p. 141. 
Other witnesses testified at trial, however, none were 
inside the home at the time of the event and provided only 
circumstantial support for the State's theory. The State's 
only direct evidence of the events inside the home on August 
12, 1999 was elicited through Mrs. Holbert. 
The State's witnesses included Mrs. Holbert's neighbor, 
who testified that she called police after one of the 
children told her their dad had "locked them out of the 
house, wouldn't let'em in, and that he had their mother in 
the house and he was hurting her." R. 220 p. 170. 
The State called an Ogden detective who testified to two 
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prior investigations of a protective order violation and 
domestic violence which did not produce sufficient evidence 
to warrant prosecution. According to the detective, she 
investigated a protective order violation in June which was 
not prosecuted due to lack of evidence, R. 220 p. 205, and 
she testified that there had been a reported break-in at 
Mrs. Holbert's home. R. 220 p. 207. 
The State also called a Clearfield City police officer 
testified that he "learned through the conversation" with 
his ex-wife and the defendant's wife that there was a reward 
for the apprehension of the defendant. R. 220 p. 179. The 
officer apprehended the defendant in Clearfield on September 
27th. R. 220 p. 177. During a search of the defendant's 
backpack incident to the his arrest, the officer discovered 
a revolver. R. 220 p. 183. 
The testimonies of the defendant and Mrs. Holbert about 
the events of August 12, 1999 differ dramatically. The 
defendant testified at trial that on August 11, 1999, Mrs. 
Holbert called him at his apartment at approximately 8:30 in 
the evening and asked him to meet her at their home the next 
day between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. R. 220 p. 307-308. 
According to the defendant, Mrs. Holbert had changed her 
mind about their "marriage situation" and he could spend 
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some time with the family. R. 220 p. 308. When the 
defendant arrived at the home the next day, his children 
were outside standing beside the car which was parked in the 
driveway. R. 220 p. 312. Mrs. Holbert was talking on her 
cell phone when Defendant approached her. R. 220 p. 315. He 
testified that he overheard Mrs. Holbert say into the phone 
"he's here." R. 220 p. 317. Mrs. Holbert walked ahead of 
him to the front door of the house and she told him to "come 
on." R. 220 p. 317. As they walked past the children, Mrs. 
Holbert yelled to the children to get into the car. R.220 p. 
317. The defendant testified that he recalled wondering 
why the children had to get into the car when he thought 
they were going to have a visit. R. 220 p. 319. However, he 
continued to follow Mrs. Holbert into the home. Mrs. 
Holbert shut the front door and the defendant went into the 
bedroom to get a document he understood from Mrs. Holbert to 
be there. R. 220 p. 320. As he walked past the bedroom 
dresser, he noticed a gun on the top of the dresser. R. 220 
p. 324. Mrs. Holbert entered the bedroom behind the 
defendant, picked up the gun, and pointed at Mr. Holberts' 
chest. R. 220 p. 325. According to the defendant, Mrs. 
Holbert asked him why he couldn't be like other guys and 
"just leave," and that if she had to kill him, she would. 
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R. 220 p. 327. 
Mrs. Holbert was distracted by the ring of the doorbell. 
R. 220 p. 328. When she looked away, the defendant grabbed 
the gun and took it from her. R. 220 p. 328. He admitted 
that after he took the gun from her, he did point it back at 
her for three to four seconds. R. 220 p. 328. But, he then 
put the gun in his coat pocket, walked past Mrs. Holbert, 
who was standing in the bedroom door, and he walked out the 
front door. R. 220 p. 330. Before he left the home, the 
defendant indicated he told Mrs. Holbert that she had 
tricked him to get him there in order to get him in trouble. 
R. 220 p. 330-331. One of the children told him the police 
were on their way. R. 220 p. 331. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims several errors by the trial court and 
trial counsel which resulted in the introduction at trial of 
inadmissible, irrelevant and prejudicial evidence raising 
fundamental questions of fairness arising from the 
possibility that the defendant's conviction was not based 
upon evidence of the events of August 12, 1999, but was 
based on his presumed bad character. 
The impact of any testimony depends upon the jury's 
perception of how credible the witness is. Defendant's 
Case No. 2001047-CA Page 17 of 47 
credibility was damaged, to a significant degree by the 
prior crimes, wrongs and acts evidence elicited by the State 
during trial. But for the prejudicial effect of evidentiary 
errors throughout the trial, the jury could have found 
either found the State failed to meet its burden to prove 
the elements of aggravated kidnaping beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or it could have found the defendant 
guilty of aggravated assault, 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
PRIOR BAD ACT TESTIMONY 
Evidence of prior "crimes, wrongs or acts" is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith." U.R.E. Rule 404(b). 
The evidence may be admissible, however, "for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under 
this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a 
non-character purpose" unless the evidence is not relevant 
or, if relevant, is not prejudicial. U.R.E. 402, 403. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
Case No. 2001047-CA Page 18 of 47 
determination of the action more probably or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." U.R.E. 4 01. 
The problem with other crimes evidence was succinctly 
stated by the Court in State v. Doporto, 
"the prejudice that can flow from admitting evidence of 
other crimes committed by a defendant can be unusually 
prejudicial, raising acute concerns of fundamental 
fairness arising from the real possibility that the 
defendant will be convicted for his presumed bad 
character rather than his acts. 
935 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah 1997). 
When reviewing a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence under of prior convictions, wrongs and acts, the 
appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard. 
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,5 18, P.3d . In the 
proper exercise of that discretion, trial judges must 
"scrupulously" examine the evidence before it is admitted. 
Id. 
During the State's direct examination of the defendant's 
wife, the State asked Mrs. Holbert about an occurrence on 
May 18, 1999. R. 220 p. 99. Over objection of defense 
counsel, the State was permitted to elicit the following 
A: I never got to the phone. I touched the phone, but I 
never got it. He picked me up by my neck and choked me 
unconscious. When he grabbed me by my neck, I blacked 
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out. I was thrown approximately four to five feet into 
my kitchen and hit the kitchen table. I was then - when 
I came to the first time, I was doing a backbend over 
the kitchen table and he had his hands around my neck 
and he was choking me. I just remember my back hurting 
really bad and him choking me. I blackout out again. 
The second time I came to, I was laying on the kitchen 
floor next to the kitchen table with him kneeling over 
top of me and choking me. 
Q: Then what happened? I mean, I guess he stopped at some 
point, is that right? 
R. 220 p. 101-102. 
The State successfully argued that the evidence was 
"foundational for the incident that occurred on the 12th of 
August just after that because it leads up to everything 
that occurred on the day in question." R. 220 p. 99. 
The witness continued, "[H]e then held me hostage for an 
hour and a half. R. 220 p. 101-102. At that point, defense 
counsel objected again to the testimony, the prosecutor 
indicated he wasn't "asking for that answer either," and the 
objection was sustained as non-responsive. R. 220 p. 102. 
Defense counsel did not request, and the court did not 
provide, a curative instruction to the jury. 
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The trial court erred in permitting, over objection, 
Mrs. Holbert's description of the May 18, 1999 assault 
because the testimony's inherently prejudicial effect far 
outweighed any minimal probative value to the incident three 
months later. The testimony was not probative of the 
defendant's opportunity, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
mistake, accident or identity. 
Mrs. Holbert's testimony was highly inflammatory and 
prejudicial to the defendant. Any probative value in the 
information for foundational purposes was certainly 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect in demonstrating to the 
jury that the defendant had abused and taken his wife 
"hostage" on a previous occasion. The elicited testimony 
went beyond, and was not probative of, the defendant's 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See, U.R.E. 
608. Testimony of the defendant's prior guilty plea to 
assault was improper as the assault was not punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year nor did it 
involve dishonesty or false statement. See, U.R.E. 609. 
Evidence of the incident between the defendant and his wife 
several months before the events giving rise to the charges 
for which defendant faced trial, even if relevant, was 
highly prejudicial. The evidence was used to prove the 
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character of the defendant in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. The resulting prejudice to the 
defendant raises concerns of fundamental fairness arising 
from the real possibility that the defendant was convicted 
for his presumed bad character rather than his conduct on 
August 12, 1999. The trial court should have prohibited the 
testimony. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE DEFENDANT'S APARTMENT 
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT. 
Defendant was employed as a maintenance man for Cherry 
Creek Apartments and moved into that complex some time in 
the summer of 1999. R. 221 p. 62. The apartment manager 
testified that the defendant was paid an hourly wage and 
received a discount on his rent. R. 221 p. 63. The manager 
"was not sure'7 but she believed that the defendant's rent 
was "taken out of his check - on a biweekly basis," R. 221 
p. 63-64. At some point, the defendant left a note for the 
manager indicating that he "was not going to be working at 
Cherry Creek anymore." R. 221 p. 63-64. The manager did 
not recall if the note indicated the defendant would not be 
living at Cherry Creek as well. R. 221 p. 65. After the 
manager did not see the defendant for "a number of days," 
the apartment was posted with a note on the door giving 
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notice that the apartment had been abandoned1. R. 221 p. 65. 
After the manager determined the apartment had been 
abandoned, she permitted Detective Croyle to "look at 
things." R. 221 p. 66. 
Detective Croyle was recalled by the State to testify as 
to telephone numbers she had retrieved from defendant's 
caller I.D. inside the defendant's apartment. Detective 
Croyle testified that the apartment manager was "going to 
box the stuff up and put it in a storage shed and hold it 
for another 30 days." R. 221 p 69. Defendant's trial 
counsel objected to the detective's search of the 
defendant's property without first obtaining a search 
warrant. R. 221 p 69. The State responded that the 
defendant's expectation of privacy dissipated after the 
apartment had been abandoned, and that the apartment owner 
had the ability to give permission to the peace officer to 
1Abandonment is presumed where the tenant has not 
notified the owner that he or she will be absent from the 
premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days 
after the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence that 
the tenant is occupying the premises; or, the tenant has not 
notified the owner that he or she will be absent from the 
premises, and the tenant fails to pay rend when due and the 
tenant's personal property has been removed from the 
dwelling unit and there is no reasonable evidence that the 
tenant is occupying the premises. U.C.A. 78-36-12.3. From 
the testimony available in the record, it does not appear 
that the requirements for abandonment were established. 
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enter the premises once that determination had been made. 
R. 221 p. 71. The court made the following finding: 
...that the testimony has been that the defendant left a 
note in the office of the management indicating that he 
had left the premises in advance of the end of the 
month, that the management deemed that he had abandoned 
the premises, and as a result, there is no expectation 
of privacy. And, therefore, the premises have been 
returned to the management. The management had a right 
to allow this detective to enter the premises without 
the necessity of a search warrant." 
R. 221 p. 71. The court's finding was clearly erroneous 
because it was based on an incorrect statement of the 
manager's testimony. The manager testified that the 
defendant left a note for the manager indicating that he 
"was not going to be working at Cherry Creek anymore." R. 
221 p. 63-64. The manager did not, as indicated by the 
court, recall if the note indicated the defendant would not 
be living at Cherry Creek as well. R. 221 p. 65. 
Therefore, the testimony was unclear as to whether the 
defendant intended to abandon his apartment when he resigned 
from his position as maintenance man for the complex. 
Whether the defendant abandoned his apartment for search 
and seizure purposes, is a factual question of intent to 
voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other 
grounds by State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). The 
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burden of proving abandonment falls on the state, Id. 
(citations omitted), and must be shown by "clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence." Id. (citations 
omitted). It is "measured from the vantage point" of the 
defendant, and not the police." Id. (citations omitted). 
"It is only the defendant's state of mind that counts." Id. 
In this case, the state failed in its burden to show by 
"clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence" that the 
defendant intended to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his apartment when he tendered his 
resignation as maintenance man for the apartment complex. 
The only testimony offered in support of abandonment came in 
through the apartment manager who did not recall whether the 
defendant indicated he would not be living at the apartment 
complex. The court presumed the defendant left prior to the 
end of the month. The manager believed defendant's rent was 
automatically deducted from his paycheck on a bi-weekly 
basis. There was no "unequivocal" evidence that defendant's 
rent was not paid through the end of the month, and the 
detective testified she could not recall which date she went 
into the apartment. 
The State did not meet its burden to show by clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence that the defendant 
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intended to voluntarily relinquish his reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his apartment. The trial court 
erred in allowing evidence obtained from the defendant's 
apartment without a search warrant. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in part, in "all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have Assistance of 
counsel for his defense." U. S. Const, amend. VI. The 
right to counsel has been held to be "the right to effective 
assistance of counsel." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 
(Utah 1990)/ citing State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 
(Utah 1976). 
With respect to any ineffectiveness claim, the defendant 
must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. State v. Litherland, 2000 
UT 76,119, 12 P.3d 92, citing Strickland v. Washington, 
466. U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); citations omitted. Defendant 
must also show that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial, i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case. 
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D e f e n d a n t c : :»n t e i d s t r i a 1 :: o i i n s < *1 ' : • p e r f o r m a n c e was 
deficient i:i m a t he: 
-failed to object to the State's ii ltroduction of 
a 1 2 egat:i ons < » !=: ' *< >mP^t i r. \.- -.  -nce and protective order 
violations which were not prosecuted f-' *! ^ k of evidence; 
-failed to oh v * " 
investigation of an attempted break-in at the family's home 
which yielded no evidence that, defendant was invo.ved; 
- f a :i ] e d t : • r e qu e s t a : i 11: a t i i e :i i I s 1 ' ~ : ^  w. n g a n 
unresponsive and inflammatory answer to one of the 
prosecutor's statements alleging deie:--...-
occasion, had assaulted her and hela hei "hostage"; 
-failed to request a m istrial or curative instruction 
a £ t e r M r s . 1 1 o ] b e r t t e s t i f i e d a b o i I t d e f e i I d a n t'" s p r i o i 
conviction for simple assault and other prior bad acts; 
-fai:eu to prepare witnesses to te^tii^ ... *.ne 
defendant's behalf, 
-failed to request a jury instruction on defendant's 
11; i e o r y o f s e ] f d e f e n s e . 
Counsel' s f a:: ; u r e tc see k a curative instruction after 
the jury received evidence c\ ne lerer.uar;' ' s prior crimes 
and bad cor ; . -- . ana the iacK ui wxtne^s preparation 
atfected nhr- outcome .>f the case. The damaging evidence 
went directly to the jury's assessment of the defendant's 
credibility. 
When the defendant does not object on the record to 
evidence admitted at trial relief on appeal is only 
available to him if admission of the evidence was plain 
error. See, State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, 16, 18 P.3d 
1123,(citation omitted). "Plain error requires a showing 
that ,fl(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome" for the defendant. 
Id. at 1 7 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993))." To show obviousness of the error, the defendant 
must show that the law was clear at the time of trial. Id, 
citing State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(error is not plain where there was no settled appellate law 
to guide the trial court). 
Failure to Object to Irrelevant 
Evidence Is Defective Performance. 
During the State's case in chief, the prosecutor 
elicited testimony of an incident investigated Detective 
Croyle which did not result in prosecution of the defendant. 
Croyle testified she worked with Mrs. Holbert on a June 3rd 
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ma 11 e i, n - : : . ^' - r r r t e ct i ve o rde r 
case. And ended up being, due to the fact that there was 
r~t enough c^ysical evidence collected .it. the ucene, i I1 'UM1 
ii inal: >] e 1 - I: x j: >roseci ited. R. 220 p 205. The detective 
continued that she qo: "all the police reports" and 
submit tie a ci^i a tt ' f- . ~> 
a vi- because its classified as a violation protective order 
11
 * x : screened and u] timately declined because there was no 
: : '" . Defense counsel did 
not object it one testimony. 
Testimony about 'h^ nrior . . 
of a protective order which was "unable t^ ~e prosecuted" is 
clearly irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 4 02 of the 
Ru 1 es c > f E v :i • :ience , I I A-- L 
relevant is not admissible-. _I^J .-•.% * .- -r.admissi-
bility of irrelevant evidence was estai - isnea at \. v ..-- f 
The testimony '.r other "wrongs or acts" ^ u e pri^r 
relevance to the offense tried and ;s .inadmissible under 
Rule 404 of the Rules of Evidence. u.. .:-_.. , , evidence of 
• >* h ^ \ i J UN , y/r -n v -t , I'm 1 - ' - o±v tu prove 
character cf person in order to show action i n conformity 
therewith). 
The detective testified, when questioned further about 
her knowledge of Mrs. Holbert, of an investigation into a 
reported attempted break-in at Mrs. Holberts' home. R. 220 
p. 206, 207. According to the detective, crime scene 
investigators responded to the home and obtained photographs 
of some shoe prints under a window. R.220 p. 207. A door 
and window were processed for latent prints. R. 220 p. 207. 
No prints were recovered and "there was no actually (sic) 
evidence other than the photograph - " R. 220 p. 207. 
The defendant was not charged in the incident, but he 
was obviously a suspect in the attempted break-in because 
the detective was permitted to testify that officers 
conducted a search of the his apartment complex but were 
unable to locate his vehicle. R. 220 p. 207. Despite the 
absence of any evidence connecting defendant to the 
attempted break-in, the clear implication in the testimony 
was that the defendant attempted to break-in to his wife's 
home. R. 220 p. 206, 207. 
Whether or not there was an attempted break-in at the 
wife's home, the mere fact of the investigation had 
absolutely nothing to do with the charge of aggravated 
kidnaping and was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible 
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,r;-> ' K l" , Hie testimony was clearly elicited for 
the purpose of proving defendant's character to act in 
conformity with the aJ leydti i >\i±\ .iqdui"it I n l>> lli^  State. 
Defense counsel did not object to the testimony. 
Evidence of prior investigations for domestic violence 
--.". : ; >' : •• : ' ": '. I 6 S U i t i n 
prosecution is irrelevant. Evidence th'it oolice 
investigated an attempted orea.-. *:. : . - -
•^^  •
 :
 ^ - oefore and that officers searched defendant's 
apartment complex for his car but couldn't find it is 
i rrele\; ai 1 t. I -.-•---•. :e::"- -~ -—••: • TT - E 
402. The law on admissibility • t irreJevant evidence was 
settled at the time of tria.1, Lhererore, the admission ot 
1
 -
:
 ' •-]--• ' -•'• • ^  . :. error. 
Failure to Request a Mistrial 
Or To Request A Curative Instruction is 
Defective Performance. 
In response to defense counsel's qi lestion that Mrs. 
Holbert continued to have contact with defendant, the 
-* * -*. * - —r,ons:ve answer and U3ve 
testimony o: + r.e defendant':^ rricr conviction for assault: 
the court ana I wasn't notified that h^ w^3 go^ng to court. 
And ±\ he wen*" to cv;rt and pled guilty to simple assault. 
Because - it's a long story, but he went to court and pled 
guilty to simple assault..," R. 220 p 167. The prejudicial 
effect of the "other crimes" testimony compounded the 
prejudicial effect of the witnesses testimony that the 
defendant held her "hostage" on a prior occasion, for which 
the jury did not receive a curative instruction. Despite 
the obvious reference to clearly inadmissible testimony of 
defendant's "other crimes, wrong or acts" yet again, defense 
counsel neither sought a mistrial nor did he seek a curative 
instruction. 
It is the trial court's responsibility to determine if 
an incident rises to the level requiring a mistrial, and it 
is the trial court which must decide if an "Nincident may 
have or probably influenced the jury, to the prejudice of 
[the defendant].1" State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51 f 18, 982 
P.2d 19, citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 
(Utah 1997) (quoting Burton v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 
122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514, 517 (1952)). 
It is well settled that other crimes testimony is 
inadmissible under U.R.E. Rule 404(b). The State 
acknowledged evidence of a prior conviction to be 
prejudicial to the defendant's ability to obtain a fair 
trial. After the witness testified, and during an in-
Case No. 2001047-CA Page 32 of 47 
i - : - - . , , . . . : . ' T - -
 v O I 5 u I u e phot -"Tramie 
evidence reia:ea v: ' : • defendant':? ori ; assault 
conviction, defense counsel st^ieo n- -_•-,/ 
. _..,• ._, Lecord as to this incident, he has already 
pled -ruilty. " 22 2 ;; 2-16. The prosecutor responded, "m, 
t i i e i : • • • *-
distinctly not sought that because I don't wanna (sic) have 
a prior conviction or some other conviction of this 
-~m. • • • . -r * - to make a determination 
:i n tms case ;n a fa:- fashion-"' :* . 2^2 ;~ , ~^ "7. 
witness's testimony about the prior assault charge, cut the 
fact that he may not have heard it does not r^?n ^he mxy 
:J i dn' t 1 ie a i i I: 11 i€ :i rripo r t ai It 1: h :i n g f: < : 
prosecutor's remark is that he knows prior cc ::vi czI on 
testimony bears on the jury's ability to make a deter-
mination of the case in a fair fashion. Trial counsel 
obviously heard the remark because his opposition to the 
[ hi it nqr aphs w i h^p'l
 Mn t he | |,-t t ti it t H.st. imnnv >"'t t"h* 
prior assault had already come in, yet he made no effort, to 
cure the resulting harm. 
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible under rule 
"
n4'rx \ r v\x evidence is relevant to a proper, non-
-">• Pag> 
character purpose, unless its danger for unfair prejudice 
and the like substantially outweighs its probative value. 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ff 20-23, 993 P.2d 837, cert, 
denied, 120 S.Ct. 1181 (2000). Defendant claims the prior 
bad acts evidence was not relevant to a proper, non-
character purpose, and its danger for unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighed any probative value. The 
introduction of "other crimes evidence" was inadmissible, 
the inadmissibility of the evidence was settled at the time 
of trial, therefore, admissions of "other crimes evidence" 
was plain error. 
Failure to Prepare Witnesses For Trial is 
Defective Performance. 
The defense counsel called four witnesses to testify 
during the defendant's case-in-chief: two workers from the 
Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), one 
investigating police officer, and an individual who had 
worked with the defendant for "four to six months" in eithe 
March 1998, R. 220 p. 304, or from September 1998 to April 
1999, R. 220 p. 305. 
It does not appear by the trial testimony of the DCFS 
workers, that trial counsel adequately prepared them for 
their testimony. Worker Jackie Bell testified in response 
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1: :» tl le quest J • : >i 1 o *. ii^ r
 L ^ ^ • Holbertj whether she 
felt that the children wouJd be safe w: 4 • \- : husband R i c k ? " 
the witness responde. :- • ' • 3 : • g ai 1 :i 
' ' r< been since ^99 so if I can just take a mirr.r e to finisn 
reading this." P 220 p. 273. The prosecutor m e n asKt; • ^ 
see ine entii dijcuiiu lit uid, i:ros,« ^v .:jm i na* r . elicitea 
testimony from its contents. Worker Nancy Dunn was invited 
to review her notes betore she demons Li a Led .i me^«l t:oi her 
reco 1 1 ectiori t:o be refreshed: 
Q: Wei: e yoi I working with them, [Division of Child and Family 
Ser vices] oi i Aug i ist 1 2th of 1 999? 
A: Yes I was. 
Q: ^id you have an opportunity to meet with Suann HolbeiI 
-'•*.* ^ ? 
Ai Yes, I di d. 
n #
 1 \. i I d t h a t w o u 1 d b e a b o u t ] : 0 0 •• : • • : ] c • • : k :i i I 11: I e a f t e r n o o n : 
n. I believe so. 
?• Did you have an opportunity to review your locb; .. ... 
I i o "i i 1 i k e t o t a k e a .1 o o k a t t h a t again? 
A: I did review it out in the hall. 
R 220 p. 281. 
The emp] oyer called to testify for the defendant clearly 
had v. preparation prior to his testimony. He wasn't able 
k- Page IS r i . / 
to provide clear testimony about the time period he worked 
with the defendant. On cross examination, the witness 
testified: 
Q: Okay, Have you ever - and when did he terminate his 
employment, regardless of the circumstances of 
termination? 
A: When did he? 
Q: Yeah, when 
A: It'd have been in - probably in the fall - or I mean 
excuse me, Spring. 
Q: Of-
A: Maybe -
Q: Of 2000 or 1999? 
A: Well, it wouldn't be 2000, and I don't think it was '99. 
Q: '98? 
A: Yes. 
R. 220 p. 304. 
On cross examination, the lack of preparation of the 
witness was reinforced by counsel's inquiry: 
Q: Did I just sort of call you at the spur of the moment 
today to come down and testify? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you have any time to research records of when 
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e x a c t J y R i c k w a s w o r k i n g f :> r y o i 1 ? 
A: No. 
F , 22 0 p. 305. '• 
The witnesses called to testify jur [ >- r -^ • ^ r* ' • --- -
in-chief were net adequately prepared i:r rriai. Failure to 
performance, 
E'allure to Request a Self-Defense 
Instruction is Defective Performance 
The defendant is entitled to have the ji iry instructed on 
hi s theory of the case, if there is any substantial evidence 
tO -'-.Ft -'-- : " ',.' 
23 Utah _:d 7 7. 477 \ . /.d T.h (Utah 1969*, The aefenaai.L 
contend:*:11 til 7 - vunsel "7s performance was selective because 
h e did not request a ^ell-defense irr^" 4 *i, an^ J 1 hat I he 
trial court erred i ^  net providing m e «: with the 
i i istr ] i- zt. i on. *•• . : > . : ' ; . . ^et tu the trial 
court's failure to give * hf* instruction. .7 pdr~v rr-jy not 
abbiijii cab eiiur any portion ' ?.ne charge or oiuission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto r*-* 
instructed " 5----, ~tate \. Medina Juarez, 2C01 U7 7L*, 
. -• - a_,; ..;. a par** v ' ., la^j.ur^ ^ ^ 
object, "error may be assigned to instructions m tr :-
C ~ -, _ p r\ > i in * "- JI ,-« r 
avoid a manifest injustice." Id. 
Defendant testified that his wife aimed the gun at him 
and indicated her desire that he die. He also testified 
that he was able to take the gun from her when she was 
distracted, and he did point the gun back at her. Despite 
his self-defense theory, trial counsel, failed to request a 
self-defense instruction. Arguably, by the time the jury 
received its instruction, it was so prejudiced against the 
defendant after hearing all the irrelevant, inadmissible and 
prejudicial evidence of criminal investigations which did 
not result in prosecution, inadmissible prior wrongs and 
misdemeanor convictions, that a self-defense instruction was 
unlikely to benefit the defendant. Nonetheless, given that 
the defendant's testimony that he pointed the gun at his 
wife in self-defense, it was manifestly unjust that the jury 
was not asked to consider the theory of his defense. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING 
Defendant contends the evidence did not support the 
jury's verdict finding him guilty of aggravated kidnaping. 
In addition, defendant asserts error by the trial court in 
denying his motion for a new trial or alternatively a 
conviction for the crime of aggravated assault because the 
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aggravated ki dna; .• r^-^ merged with the aggravated 
assault charge, notw:~hstandina the State's effort to 
deprive the defendant of tl le bei lefi !:  < D E: i E i.er ger i n, d :i smi :  >si i i j 
t: .he aggravated assault charge right before trial. 
The facts of events which occurred i nside Mrs. Holbert's 
i lome )i i Aug usl : 1 2 1 $ -9S i I .1 .e ; ] :i • jl .t n L , .1 £av< Dral: •] e t .c the • 
jury verdict, set forth above, were eli cited primarily from 
Mrs, Holbert, as only she and the defendant were presei it 
:i i is:i de tl ic: ; he: - - • • Line of the incident. 
Utah courts have adopted a three p-.;r t. -l ~st to determine 
j t I i dna pi r. -L :s- .«.. *; . ' . " - , • . , 
2001 UT App u.^j, i l w I . J G . ^i ^ taking or 
confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
: : . * • • • ? 
movement or confinement : - n. ,^ r : * : - ^iiaht, 
inconsequentia 1 and mere 1 y incidenta 1 to t:he o11 ier crin i,e; 
(b) must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the 
other crime, and (c) must have some significance independent 
: f tl : .€ ; : t l le n : ::r:i me i i : tl la t i t n: Lake s t l n = : • tl ie:i : < ::i: i me 
substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens 
the r i s K ,i i ^  t tr n 11 c (quo t i n g SI a t e v I " i n 1 a ys o n, 
2000 I JT . ' ^ 4 r.^u ±^43 (citations omitted)). 
In Lopez, the defendant placed the vie' [rr '•_
 a headlcck 
and dragged her down a flight of stairs, around the 
apartment building and down a sidewalk. He then tried to 
force her into his truck. The appellate court determined 
that the defendant's conduct did not satisfy a single prong 
of the Finlayson three-prong test and it affirmed the 
defendant's conviction. 
In the instant case, the defendant's confinement was 
inconsequential and incidental to the crime of aggravated 
assault. The defendant "shoved" Mrs. Holbert into her home 
and shut the door behind them. R. 220 p. 118. The 
defendant removed a gun from his waistband and pointed it at 
Mrs. Holberts' head while he locked the door with his other 
hand. R. 220 p. 119. Mrs. Holbert ran to the back door and 
unlocked the chain, dead bolt and doorknob lock and opened 
the door, however the defendant slammed it shut. R. 220 p. 
123. She was either pushed by the defendant into the 
bedroom, or she cannot recall how she ended up in the 
bedroom. R. 220 p. 122-124. Defendant then shut the 
bedroom door and again pointed the gun at Mrs. Holbert. R. 
220 p. 125. The defendant then told her he was going to 
kill her. R. 220 p. 125. The defendant was distracted by 
the doorbell and he left the house. R. 220 p. 127. The 
entire incident lasted approximately four minutes. R. 220 
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p. 141. 
In addition to testimony from Mrs. Holbert, the jury 
hhidiil testimony J j i iin 111,1., Hulbert's neighbor that one of the 
children reported] y told her "my dad's hurting my mom, 
220 p. 172. 
C o i i f i n e i i: iei 11 • : i : m : > verne n t :i i I 11 :i i s : • a s = • i 'a s s ] i ght, 
inconsequential and merelv incidental t_ trie other crime 
Mjjjia.i.q \,. "..-., \i^^ .^uri , ' .^ racts ^f :\is ^ ?.se more 
accurately fit the crime oi £'i.r av;-.:» : 
1 4 . The court, however, did no* bei; e v< *" : . • r. i s v :^V, : 
I < '_oped that they would convict h-Liu on anoravated 
assault because I fe.1 t that the facts of this case more 
accurateiy * - • : ed, ai I n igl I t:
 r j n ist 
m\ , . sense ?: Justice, ;s that would have been more 
<:.:..:!; He movement ^r confinement 
was very slight.'" Id. Even the trial ouurt :-" 
the first proncf of the Finlayson test w ^ satisfied. 
Secorn J ,  " KJ i nil i i M I I I I * :on f i rittniri 11 . • he 
nature of an '^ciqravated assault. J.n response to the trial 
c< . • ..- . i, ' ldo you not agree that... every time a 
person pulls m gun on somebody, t 
there is inherent a detention?" R, z23 p. J' '. The 
Case iNc '-^'' ' ' \ . Page 4] « -f 4 ; 
prosecutor argued "no," that there are a "myriad of 
circumstances where guns have been pulled on people in 
public places where they're capable of just taking off-" R. 
223 p. 17. However, if capacity to flee is a legitimate 
consideration, then the prosecutor is assuming that some 
victims with the capacity to flee but who do not flee are 
somehow contributing to their confinement. Capacity to flee 
is not the test: The test is inherent nature of the other 
crime, and the trial court properly recognized the inherent 
nature of a detention in an aggravated assault. 
Third, the confinement and movement have no significance 
independent of an aggravated assault. Mrs. Holbert 
testified that the defendant pointed the gun as he was 
trying to lock the front door and chased her until they 
eventually ended up in the bedroom, where he threatened to 
kill her. The locking of the front door merely made the 
commission of the assault easier and it lessened the risk of 
detection by the children. 
The evidence did not support the jury's finding of guilt 
to the offense of aggravated kidnaping. The facts in this 
instance satisfy all three prongs of Finlayson. The 
defendant should have been afforded the benefit of merger of 
aggravated kidnaping with aggravated assault. 
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THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS 
COMMITTED DURING TRIAL UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE 
THAT A FAIR TRIAL WAS HAD. 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, a verdict will be 
reversed only if "the cumulative effect of the several 
errors undermines our confidence...that a fair trial was 
had." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 144, 994 P.2d 177. The 
cumulative effect of the errors during this trial supports a 
finding of "no confidence" that a fair trial was had. 
Once again, the errors claimed include testimony of 
domestic violence and protective order violations for which 
the defendant was not prosecuted for lack of evidence; 
testimony of an attempted break-in at the family's home 
which yielded no evidence that defendant was involved; no 
curative instruction following an unresponsive and 
inflammatory answer to one of the prosecutor's statements 
alleging defendant, on a prior occasion, had assaulted her 
and held her "hostage"; no self-defense instruction; no 
request for mistrial after Mrs. Holbert testified about 
defendant's prior conviction for simple assault and other 
prior bad acts; defense counsel's failure to limit the scope 
of cross examination for one of his witnesses which 
permitted damaging testimony against the defendant, and 
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defense counsel's failure investigate and subpoena witnesses 
provided to him by the defendant as potential character 
witnesses and rebuttal witnesses to Mrs. Holbert's version 
of her relationship with the defendant. Those errors are 
compounded by the court's denial of efforts by counsel to 
exclude evidence illegally obtained without a search warrant 
and prior bad act or bad character testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The law with respect to the inadmissibility of 
prejudicial and irrelevant testimony is well settled. 
Testimony about domestic violence and protective order 
violations, declarations that the defendant's wife was the 
"victim of domestic violence" and the investigation into the 
attempted break-in of Mrs. Holbert's home was elicited by 
the State solely for the purpose of demonstrating to the 
jury that the defendant must have kidnaped his wife at 
gunpoint because his character was presumed to be bad. That 
portrayal of the defendant was bolstered by Mrs. Holbert's 
statement that the defendant had held her "hostage" on a 
previous occasion. Without benefit of a curative 
instruction at the time of the remark essentially eliminated 
any possibility the jury could have reasonably concluded 
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anything but guilt on the charge of aggravated kidnaping. 
Defendant was not convicted based upon the evidence of the 
events on August 12, 1999; defendant was convicted on the 
basis of previous unprosecuted charges of domestic violence, 
the inference that he had attempted a break-in at his wife's 
home, and inflammatory descriptions of prior domestic 
violence offered for "foundational" purposes. 
The evidence elicited during trial was prejudicial to 
the defendant because there were no other witnesses to the 
events inside the home at the time Mrs. Holbert claimed to 
have been confined by the defendant. The jury had to choose 
between two contradictory versions of the same event: Mrs. 
Holbert's version that the defendant forced his way into the 
home, chased her through the house and confined her in the 
bedroom at gunpoint for four minutes, and the defendants 
version that Mrs. Holbert set him up by calling him the 
night before to invite him to spend time with his family, 
she the led him into the home, pulled a gun on him, was 
distracted by the children outside which enabled the 
defendant to take the gun from her, he pointed the gun at 
her briefly and in self-defense, and he left the home. But 
for testimony that defendant had pled guilty to assault 
before, that he had held his wife hostage before, and that 
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he was suspected of attempting to break into his wife's home 
before, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury's 
verdict would have been different. 
The trial court committed reversible error in admitting 
evidence of prior crimes, wrongs and acts which bears on the 
jury's ability to make a determination in the case in a fair 
fashion, and for refusing to grant defendant's motion to 
arrest judgment. 
The cumulative errors committed by the trial court, 
including evidence of prior crimes, wrongs and acts, and 
admitting evidence obtained from the defendant's apartment 
without a search warrant, as well as the errors committed by 
trial counsel which facilitated inadmissible, irrelevant and 
prejudicial evidence to be considered by the jury raise 
fundamental questions of fairness arising from the 
possibility that the defendant's conviction was not based 
upon evidence of the events of August 12, 1999, but was 
based upon his presumed bad character. 
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